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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers play a variety of roles in intragroup dissent. A lawyer may 
work to prevent or plan for disputes, facilitate communication or adjudica-
tion, or represent one side in its expression of dissent or effort to quash it. 
While lawyers sometimes identify as members of the groups whose disa-
greements they seek to resolve, they often stage interventions in communi-
ties from which they stand apart.1
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Many thanks to Anthony 
Amsterdam, John C. Boger, Frances C. Castillo, Jack Greenberg, Sarah Holladay, Rob J. Smith, and 
Bryan Stevenson for sharing their observations from capital defense practice. Thanks also to Al Brophy, 
Holning S. Lau, and the participants in the Intragroup Dissent symposium for helpful conversations, and 
to Nicholas Hill and Catherine McCormack for excellent research assistance. 
 1.  On rare occasions, lawyers represent parties that oppose the groups to which the lawyers 
belong. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer 
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995); ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY
ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF Freedom (1979). 
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Outsider lawyers offer special strengths. Lawyering for social change 
necessarily contests an existing social order, and dissent from within may 
be hindered by forces ranging from simple blindness to the injustice of the 
status quo to direct pressure to cooperate with dominant institutions. Out-
sider lawyers enjoy freedom from local pressures. When they contribute 
their perspectives and professional tools, their interventions can shift power 
towards particular subgroups and amplify voices that the local political 
process might otherwise drown out. 
Yet the influence of outsider lawyering raises questions of authority 
and accountability. An important critique has been that outsider lawyers 
parachute into communities, equipped with their own agendas and little 
appreciation of local context. They impose their views on the individuals or 
subgroups they claim to represent and may in fact silence, rather than sup-
port, those community members. While claiming to usher in progress and 
universal rights, they instead replicate their own, culturally-specific specif-
ic social systems and historical dominance. These critiques of outsiders’ 
legal work present challenges to the legitimacy of intervention projects and 
raise pragmatic questions about their effectiveness. 
Of course, not all critiques of outsider lawyering are equally valid.2
The charge of cultural imperialism can be falsified to undercut the legiti-
macy of advocacy that actually flows from grassroots; foes of activism may 
label it foreign by way of slur.3 The origin of ideas does not necessarily 
indicate anything about their substantive merits, and some of the labels of 
origin are simply inaccurate.4 Charges of cultural imperialism also gloss 
over or deny incidents of internal dissent.5 To maintain the visibility and 
strength of voices of internal dissent, outsider lawyers offering support 
must strive to ensure that their own position of privilege does not result in 
overstepping their role of providing support to the principal agents of 
change.
 2.  See Kimberle Crenshaw, Were the Rights Critics Right About Rights? Reassessing the Ameri-
can Debate About Rights in the Post-Reform Era, in BEYOND RIGHTS TALK AND CULTURE TALK 61,
72-73 (Mahmood Mamdani ed., 2000) (comparing human rights interventions in Africa and civil rights 
interventions in the U.S. South, and arguing that “discourses of anti-imperialism reify and in some ways 
insulate conditions of disempowerment”). 
 3.  Myths of geographic identity and origin have been used to undercut lawyering for social 
change. See Martha C. Nussbaum, In Defense of Universal Values, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 379, 383 (2000) 
(“[C]harge of ‘Westernizing’ looks like a shady political stratagem, aimed at discrediting forces that are 
pressing for change.”). On the descriptive and normative problems with labeling social change “West-
ern,” see generally Holning S. Lau, The Language of Westernization in Legal Commentary, 61 AM. J.
COMP. L. 507 (2013). 
 4.  See Lau, supra note 3, at 515-28 (describing inaccuracies of “Westernization” label). 
 5.  See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 495, 560-61, 563 (2001). 
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This Essay will examine the dynamics of outsider lawyers’ interven-
tions by exploring the case of capital defense in the Southern United States. 
Northerners have played an important role as capital defenders in the 
South.6 The litigation involving Northern lawyers in Southern courts re-
flects particular contexts of intragroup conflicts. These include both the 
historical struggle between North and South for the definition of U.S. 
American identity, as well as dissent within Southern communities. From 
the Civil War through the Civil Rights Movement, Northerners have de-
picted intervention as necessitated by the South’s moral and legal deficien-
cies, while many white Southerners have depicted white Northerners as 
invading the South for economic and political control. Capital defense in 
the U.S. South is imbued with this narrative of cultural conflict and that 
conflict has at times been used to undermine the legitimacy of the lawyers’ 
work. This story offers broader lessons on the limits of outsider lawyering.7
 6.  The definitions of “the South” and “the North” are contested and political. See Larry J. Grif-
fin, Why Was the South a Problem to America?, in THE SOUTH AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM 10, 17 
(Larry J. Griffin & Don H. Doyle eds., 1995) (“[I]n the contestation over the meaning of nation and 
region, the South became defined . . . by southerners and nonsoutherners alike ‘in opposition’ to Ameri-
ca” and “opposite to broader culture”); SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, INC., A NEW MAJORITY:
LOW INCOME STUDENTS IN THE SOUTH’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5 (2007), 
http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/b1995557-faec-42a1-a951-
5fad5491b9e4/Publications/A-New-Majority-Low-Income-Students-in-the-South-s.aspx (“[I]n name 
and in fact there are many Souths. . . . [S]cholars use definitions of the South that generally include 
from 9 to 15 states.”). The U.S. Census Bureau divides the United States into four regions, each with 
subregions: (1) West (Mountain and Pacific); (2) Midwest (West North Central and East North Cen-
tral); (3) Northeast (Middle Atlantic and New England); and (4) South (West South Central, East South 
Central and South Atlantic); the South includes the District of Columbia and the following sixteen 
states: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Oklahoma, North Carolina, Southern Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS REGIONS AND DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf. See also MICHAEL 
BRADSHAW, REGIONS AND REGIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3-5 (1988) (describing and adopting 
census definition). Some scholars limit the South to the eleven confederate states but distinguish be-
tween the Deep South—Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina and Mississippi—and the Outer 
South—Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See James M. 
Glaser, Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South, 56 J. POL.
21, 28 (1994). Critics of the death penalty in the South focus on the nine states that together account for 
the vast majority of executions carried out in the modern era—Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Georgia, 
Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. See infra note 9 and accompany-
ing text (identifying these nine states as the “Death Belt”). This Essay uses the terms “the South” and 
“the North” primarily to refer to social constructs of the regions.  To the extent that the terms do identi-
fy particular groups of states, “the South” will refer to the eleven confederate states, and “the North” 
will refer to the states identified by the U.S. Census as Northeast—Maine, Vermont, Rhode Island, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York—or East North Central Midwest—Pennsylvania and Wiscon-
sin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra.
 7.  On the comparison of international and domestic examples, Kimberle Crenshaw explains: 
[T]he spectre of the West imposing its values in the shadow of colonialism is of course a far 
more troubling concern than the complaint by white Southerners that the federal enforcement 
of civil rights constituted a reoccupation of the South by a ‘foreign’ presence. Yet what exact-
ly is to be made of the difference? Is it a matter of degree or is there a fundamental distinction 
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This Essay begins by describing the phenomenon of capital punish-
ment in the United States as a Southern problem with a Northern solution. 
It focuses on the death penalty as the descendant of lynching in the South, 
and describes the role of Northern lawyers in capital defense in the region. 
It then introduces two key rationales for intervention by outsider lawyers: 
they possess the will to confront local injustice and they contribute special 
expertise to aid the project. Such rationales, however, present inherent lim-
its, particularly in a post-colonial context. When the outsider lawyers di-
rectly confront the local social order, they encounter accusations of cultural 
imperialism; when they launch indirect attacks with conventional legal 
tools, their expertise may contribute to the portrait of them as elitist, and 
the procedural approach may lack substantive moral force. The Essay con-
cludes that for outsider lawyers to intervene effectively, they must rely on 
the language and strategy of local actors, and take their lead from the insid-
ers engaged in intragroup dissent. 
I. SOUTHERN PROBLEM AND NORTHERN SOLUTION
This part describes the historical development of the Southern death 
penalty and Northern intervention in capital defense. 
A. Death Penalty as Southern Phenomenon 
Critics of the death penalty have described Southern states as harbor-
ing a “unique fondness for capital punishment.”8 The sheer number of exe-
cutions in the South has earned the region the moniker “The Death Belt.”9
According to Amnesty International, between 1977 and 2013, the regional 
distribution of executions was as follows: 4 executions in the Northeast, 82 
in the West, 157 in the Midwest, 608 in just the states of Texas and Virgin-
ia, and 1090 in the South.10 Attorneys and scholars have questioned the 
between claims of empowered elites here and those elsewhere that reformist policies flying 
under the banner of rights constitute an affront to culture and sovereignty? 
Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 72. 
 8.  Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But 
For the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1845 (1994).  
 9.  The “Death Belt” refers specifically to the “[nine] Southern states that together account for 
over 90% of all executions carried out [in the U.S.] since 1976”—Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Georgia, 
Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 19 (2002); Roscoe C. 
Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations as a Denial of the Right to 
Counsel, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 863, 873 (1996).  
 10.  See Death Penalty and Arbitrariness, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-
work/issues/death-penalty/us-death-penalty-facts/death-penalty-and-arbitrariness (last visited Jan. 25, 
2014).  
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ability of Southern courts to provide capital trials that meet constitutional 
requirements.11 Southern judges have been accused of “‘ramrod[ing]’ death 
penalty convictions through trial and post-conviction review.”12 The capital 
trial process in the Southern United States has been described as “more like 
a random flip of the coin than a delicate balancing of the scales of jus-
tice.”13 Interpreting the administration of capital punishment in the South 
as little more than modern-day lynching, capital defense experts have ad-
vocated for intervention to protect capital defendants from the “uncivi-
lized” system of Southern justice. 
Capital punishment and lynching share a geographic history in the 
United States. Sociologists have observed a correlation between the num-
ber of lynchings in a state’s past and the number of death sentences in the 
state’s courts.14 The prevalence of lynching decreased at the same time as 
courts’ use of capital punishment increased.15 The two practices also ex-
press similar cultural struggles and similar tools of oppression, leading 
commenters to conclude that the death penalty has become a sort of legal 
replacement for the lynchings in the past.16
The practices of lynching and capital punishment have both relied on a 
myth of a black male rapist as justification for murdering African-
Americans.17 Before the Supreme Court held in Coker v. Georgia18 that the 
rape of an adult woman did not qualify as a capital offense, juries were 
notorious for disproportionately choosing death sentences for African-
American men accused of raping white women.19 In the post-
Reconstruction South, whites used the image of the black rapist as an ex-
cuse for lynching successful African-Americans who disrupted white su-
premacy.20 The murders correlated with and served as a backlash against 
increases in blacks’ economic and political power.21
 11.  See, e.g., Bright, supra note 8, 1841-42.  
 12.  Howard, supra note 9, at 874. 
 13.  Bright, supra note 8, at 1842. 
 14.  David Jacobs Carmichael et al., Vigilantism, Current Racial Threat, and Death Sentences, 70 
AM. SOC. REV. 656, 656 (2005); see Ogletree, supra note 9, at 19 (explaining the states comprising the 
“Death Belt” of capital punishment “overlap . . . with the southern states that had the highest incidence 
of extra-legal violence and killings during the Jim Crow era”). 
 15.  See Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 329, 350 (1997). 
 16.  Jacobs et al., supra note 14, at 657-58. 
 17.  MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 6-7 (University of Georgia Press, 2d ed. 
1995). 
 18.  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 19.  See generally John H. Blume, Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital 
Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771 (1998). 
 20.  BELKNAP, supra note 17. 
 21.  Id. at 2. 
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Although lynching initially targeted whites as well as African-
Americans,22 this changed during Reconstruction. By the 1890s, the overall 
number of lynchings began to drop off but the percentage of African-
American victims increased dramatically. By the early 1900s, almost all 
lynching victims were African-American. The increase in African-
American lynchings, like the creation of the Black Codes and the estab-
lishment of the Ku Klux Klan, correlated with an increase in African-
Americans’ political rights. 
Social scientists also describe lynching as the expression of class and 
cultural warfare. For some whites, lynchings symbolized the chivalry of the 
Old South and the agrarian economy taking back the power they were los-
ing to urban, industrial capitalism.23 While increasing numbers of white 
women left the enclaves of family farms for factory work, lynchings were 
portrayed as a militant form of sexual conservatism, attempts to protect the 
honor of the men and women of the region. Whites who approved of lynch-
ing justified it as essential for preserving order and stability. They viewed 
lynching as creating a more democratic order than that of government poli-
cies promulgated by the urban elite, who did not reflect the will of the citi-
zenry.24
In addition to racism and anxiety about changing gender roles, lynch-
ing may be interpreted as an expression of Southern whites’ rebellion 
against Northern forces. The clashes concerning economic change stemmed 
partly from conflicts about whether to accept the industrialization of the 
South and model it after similar changes in the North.25 Violence increased 
when national political parties attempted to defeat Southern conservatives 
by attracting black votes.26 Conservative white Southerners warned North-
erners that meddling in Southern affairs would only result in more violence 
against blacks.27
Northern legislators threatened to make lynching a federal crime, but a 
filibuster by Southern senators defeated an anti-lynching bill, claiming it 
 22.  Robert A. Gibson, The Negro Holocaust: Lynching and Race Riots in the United States, 1880-
1950, YALE-NEW HAVEN TEACHERS INST., http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/19
79/2/79.02.04.x.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (stating that between 1830 and 1850 the majority of 
lynching victims were white). 
 23.  Nancy McLean, The Leo Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual Politics in the Mak-
ing of Reactionary Populism, in JUMPIN’ JIM CROW 183, 201-02 (Jane Daley et al. eds., Princeton 
University Press 2000). 
 24.  Id.
 25.  Id. at 199-200. 
 26.  BELKNAP, supra note 17, at 7. 
 27.  Id. See also JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF 
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 95 (1994). 
2014] CAPITAL DEFENDERS AS OUTSIDER LAWYERS 575 
would have unconstitutionally infringed on states’ rights.28 Southern prose-
cutors, grand juries, and eyewitnesses failed to punish lynching as mur-
der.29 As late as 1933, less than one percent of all lynchings in the United 
States had resulted in successful prosecutions.30
In the early 1930s, however, Southern attitudes about lynching began 
to change.31 Advocates of industrialism expressed concern about how 
lynching would affect opportunities for economic growth.32 Some worried 
that, while the violence was intended to keep blacks from challenging their 
subordinate position in society, it actually convinced them to escape to the 
North, which could create labor problems for the Southern economy.33
Southerners also began to view lynching as antithetical to law and order.34
Some argue that lynching eventually became less common because South-
ern states wanted to show Washington that they could handle the problem 
on their own.35
The institution of the death penalty grew as that of lynching receded.36
Stephen Bright has explained, “The death penalty is the first cousin of 
lynching. In the 1930s and 40s, when the South—particularly Alabama, 
Georgia and Mississippi—was getting such bad press for lynching people, 
the perfunctory death penalty trial replaced lynching as a way of accom-
plishing the same thing while pretending to provide some due process.”37
Community members had previously kidnapped criminal defendants and 
lynched them as a form of vigilante justice.38 The capital trial allowed a 
judge to prevent an “extra-legal hanging” by assuring the local community 
that justice would be served with a reliably quick trial and an identical re-
sult.39 Southerners concerned about their reputation for “backward-looking 
barbarianism”40 shed the practice of lynching but adopted a formalized 
version of the same. 
 28.  BELKNAP, supra note 17, at 17-21.
 29.  Id. at 9. 
 30.  Id.
 31.  Id. at 22. 
 32.  Id. at 23. Parallel arguments are common in the international human rights context, where 
commentators suggest acceptance of liberal values supports economic development and stability. 
 33.  BELKNAP, supra note 17, at 23. 
 34.  Id.
 35.  Id. at 21. 
 36.  WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, PROXIMITY TO DEATH 32-33 (2000). 
 37.  Stephen Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not “Soft on Crime,” But Hard 
on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 479, 481-82 (1995). 
 38.  See BELKNAP, supra note 17, at 14-15; GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 217. 
 39.  MCFEELY, supra note 36, at 33. 
 40.  BELKNAP, supra note 17, at 23. 
576 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:2 
B. History of Northern Intervention 
As the practice of capital punishment spread in the South, attorneys 
from the North increasingly intervened. Organizations like the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF)41 participated in capital trials as 
early as the 1930s “as part of a tradition of trying to assure fairness to 
blacks in the criminal process.”42 In the 1970s, however, the role of North-
ern attorneys ballooned.43 In Furman v. Georgia,44 the United States Su-
preme Court struck down the death penalty as a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment whose arbitrary application violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.45 Furman appeared to signal the end of capital punishment,46
but, after the ruling, state legislative support for the practice only increased, 
especially in the South.47 Within just a few years, over thirty states amend-
ed their statutes to narrow juror discretion,48 and the Court gave the revised 
legislation its blessing.49 The number of death penalty cases exploded, and 
Northern lawyers responded.50
After Furman, Northerners and Southerners with Northern educations 
formed new capital defense projects in the South.51 The capital defense 
attorneys of the 1970s differed from those who had handled such cases on 
an ad hoc basis in the past.52 Their projects were devoted exclusively to 
capital litigation.53 These attorneys regularly filed habeas corpus petitions, 
 41.  The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had been found-
ed in 1909 in response to a lynching in Illinois. Id. at 13. In 1940, the NAACP created the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF). GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 17-18.
 42.  GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 104. See id. at 108 (“We weren’t a general legal aid society. 
Merely defending the accused, who are entitled to counsel in all counsel in all cases, wasn’t our aim, 
rather we had an agenda: to demolish Jim Crow.”) 
 43.  Interview with Anthony Amsterdam, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law 
(Jan. 22, 2002). 
 44.  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 45.  Id. at 249, 293-94, 365-96. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I simply conclude that the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal 
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”). 
46 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 362-63 (1995).
 47.  GREENBERG, supra note 27 at 486; David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the 
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings From 
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1649 (1998). 
 48.  Id.
 49.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (“[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the 
penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted 
statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance”). 
 50.  Interview with Anthony Amsterdam, supra note 43. 
 51.  Interview with Bryan Stevenson, Executive Director of the Equal Justice Initiative and Pro-
fessor of Law, New York University School of Law (Jan. 30, 2002). 
 52.  Interview with Anthony Amsterdam, supra note 43. 
 53.  Id.
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arguing that local trial counsel had been ineffective and that defendants 
deserved new trials.54 As the habeas petitions became the projects’ core 
work, post-conviction litigation in federal court developed into a recog-
nized sub-specialty.55
The post-conviction attorneys increased their anti-death-penalty suc-
cesses by enlisting other attorneys in the abolition effort. Many of these 
attorneys were Northern elites from prestigious private firms that contribut-
ed pro bono labor.56 Yet internal dissent from the South also became visi-
ble, as project attorneys enlisted local counsel with felony defense 
experience.57 By portraying criminal defense as conventional lawyering, 
local attorneys could accept such cases without provoking as much contro-
versy as if they had supported explicitly political work like litigation in 
support of racial integration.58
By 1988, habeas corpus petitions began overwhelming the federal 
courts, and Congress determined that capital defense required federal fund-
ing.59 Congress reasoned that if attorneys could be trained to provide ade-
quate representation at trials, the decrease in habeas petitions would save 
resources in the end. Through its Judicial Conference, Congress created 
twenty Death Penalty Resource Centers (DPRCs or Centers), later called 
Post Conviction Defender Organizations (PCDOs).60 The primary function 
of the PCDOs was to recruit and train attorneys who would then represent 
capital defendants and provide expertise in capital litigation.61 The PCDOs 
were set up in the jurisdictions deemed most lacking in adequate represen-
tation.62 Not all of the PCDOs were in the South, but every state in the 
Deep South received one.63
As with earlier capital defense projects, transplants from other regions 
of the country staffed the federally funded Centers in the South. In many 
ways, these demographics grew out of the projects’ design. The goal was to 
offer training and compensation to attract bright young lawyers to learn the 
practice of skilled capital defense and to continue it into the future; the 
 54.  Id.
 55.  See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 267 (2012) 
(stating that ineffective assistance claims were the “bread and butter” of capital habeas petitions). 
 56.  See GREENBERG, supra note 27. 
 57.  See id.
 58.  See id.
 59.  Howard, supra note 9, at 906-07. 
 60.  Id. at 865. 
 61.  Id. at 904. 
 62.  Id.
 63.  Id.
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projects succeeded in pulling young lawyers out of their own communities 
and into the zones where they were needed.64
Since Northern attorneys first began litigating capital cases in the 
South, the setting of the litigation has changed. In the late 1980s and mid-
1990s, several Northern states reintroduced the death penalty.65 Many ex-
patriot Southern attorneys headed North to contribute their expertise.66
When setting up the New York Capital Defender Office, its organizers 
filled the staff with attorneys from the South.67
Meanwhile, in the South, local attorneys have begun to handle more 
capital cases.68 More African-American attorneys practice in the South.69
During the 1960s and 70s, it was difficult for an African-American to make 
a living as an attorney in the South. White lawyers were not always willing 
to bring black attorneys into their firms, and even black lawyers sometimes 
preferred to avoid hiring blacks, because they knew courts would treat their 
clients unfairly.70 Now that overt discrimination has decreased and the 
availability of legal education has broadened, the black bar has grown, and 
some of its members handle capital defense.71
Despite these shifts in landscape, capital defense in the South is not 
divorced from its past, and outsider lawyers continue to maintain a dispro-
portionate presence. The majority of post-conviction attorneys still hail 
from the North.72 Lawyers based at large Northern firms continue to play a 
significant role, often relying on local counsel for admission to local courts 
but not collaborating further.73 Non-profit organizations like the Southern 
Center for Human Rights (SCHR) in Atlanta, Georgia, and the Equal Jus-
 64.  See generally Ronald J. Tabak, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and 
Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239 (1994). 
 65.  For a current summary of states with the death penalty, see States With and Without the Death 
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-
death-penalty (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). Empirical studies have begun focusing on capital defense as 
the practice of outlier counties, rather than states or national regions. See Smith, supra note 55, at 233-
246 (collecting studies and emphasizing the significance of counties). 
 66.  Interview with Anthony Amsterdam, supra note 43. 
 67.  Id.
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
LAWYER 9-10 (2012) (describing historical scarcity of black lawyers in South). 
 70.  GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 38. 
 71.  Even if African-American attorneys hail from the North, Bryan Stevenson has suggested that 
the majority of Southern audiences will view the attorneys as black rather than Northern. See Interview 
with Bryan Stevenson, supra note 51. 
 72.  Id.
 73.  See, e.g., Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 915-16 (2012) (where local Alabama counsel 
facilitated the appearance of two New-York-based lawyers from Sullivan & Cromwell, and the pro 
bono lawyers subsequently left the firm without notifying the client or the Alabama court, the client 
“was left unrepresented”). 
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tice Initiative (EJI) in Montgomery, Alabama, formed in 1976 and 1989 
respectively, continue to attract outsider attorneys to the region.74 Bryan 
Stevenson, the Executive Director of EJI, teaches at New York University 
(NYU) and Steven Bright, the Executive Director of SCHR, teaches at Yale 
University. Professor Stevenson operates a clinic through which he takes a 
group of NYU law students to live and work in Montgomery each fall se-
mester. Both SCHR and EJI also maintain fellowship programs, with EJI 
drawing on Yale’s Liman Fellowship, and both drawing on other sources as 
well. The fellowship system, a valuable source of support for non-profits 
with limited budgets, regularly introduces new staff to temporary positions 
and tends to recreate the dynamic of lawyering by community outsiders. 
Although a handful of the attorneys are native Southerners, returning to 
their communities with outside education puts them in a position different 
from that they occupied during their Southern childhoods.75 If they choose 
to remain in the South after the fellowships end, they will continue to navi-
gate from their specific vantage points. 
One might expect the presence of outsider attorneys to be less visible 
than forty years ago, because the practice of law in the United States has 
spread nationally. In particular, tort law has expanded so that parties regu-
larly engage in litigation with out-of-state companies. This brings foreign 
lawyers across state and regional boundaries frequently enough that outsid-
ers might not stick out so much as they once did.76
Yet the perceptions of capital defenders as outsiders remain remarka-
bly unchanged. Even if the offices of capital defense projects are not filled 
entirely with Northerners, many locals, including clients, believe that they 
are.77 Some capital defense attorneys argue that Southern judges and prose-
cutors intentionally perpetuate the myth of outsider lawyers to distract from 
the lack of adequate counsel in Southern states.78 The myth is a powerful 
one. The history of Northern lawyers in Southern courts has created a dy-
namic such that even where capital defense attorneys are not Northern, 
their legitimacy may be undermined as if they were. 
 74.  The organizations’ missions include criminal justice beyond capital defense, but both carry 
impressive dockets of post-conviction work. See Interview with Anthony Amsterdam, supra note 52. 
 75.  Interview with Bryan Stevenson, supra note 51. 
 76.  Id.
 77.  Interview with Jacob H. Sussman, Attorney, Tin, Fulton, Walker & Owen (Nov. 17, 2001) 
(describing the observation of his first death row client in Georgia, who marveled aloud at how “all 
these northern Jews” flock to represent capital defendants). 
 78.  Interview with Anthony Amsterdam, supra note 43. 
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II. RATIONALES FOR INTERVENTION & COLONIAL CRITIQUE
Two key rationales support intervention by outsider lawyers: these 
agents of change possess the will to confront local injustice, and they con-
tribute special expertise to the project. This part will apply these rationales 
to the case of Northern lawyers intervening in Southern capital defense. 
Such rationales, however, present inherent limits, particularly in a post-
colonial context. As this part will show, the colonial relationship between 
the North and South of the United States makes the intervention subject to 
critique as cultural imperialism. 
A. Rationales for Intervention 
Intervention by outsider lawyers relies on two rationales, which may 
be independent but mutually reinforcing. First, the outsiders bring expertise 
otherwise lacking in the community. The outsiders can contribute sophisti-
cated education, training, experience, natural talent, financial resources, 
and technology. The second rationale for outside intervention is that, re-
gardless of expertise or resources, the local community is simply unable or 
unwilling to take the positions that the outsiders do. The obstacle to their 
engagement might be emotional, intellectual, economic, or political. With 
this confluence of factors, the outsiders step in to fill a void. 
Northern intervention in Southern capital defense reflects the ration-
ales of expertise and the will to intercede. Arguments for intervention have 
historically highlighted the inadequacy of local counsel and the failure of 
Southern institutions to correct the problem on their own. Many Southern 
states lack public defender systems or provide so little funding that attor-
neys are overwhelmed or burn out well before learning the practice of capi-
tal defense. In jurisdictions that rely on appointments of local private 
counsel, the situation can be even worse. Historically, appointed attorneys 
have lacked experience with criminal law, let alone capital defense, and 
legislatures have set fees too low for the appointees to devote sufficient 
time to trial preparation.79 Lawyers have demonstrated indifference and 
open hostility towards their clients, they have failed to read the governing 
statutes, slept or remained intoxicated during trials, and referred to their 
clients using racial slurs.80 Southern states have historically failed to check 
this behavior: legislatures have failed to institute and enforce minimum 
 79.  Bright, supra note 8, at 1845-46, 1849-50. 
 80.  Id. at 1842-43.  
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qualifications for appointments,81 and judges have pressed ahead with trials 
in the face of counsel’s blatant inadequacies. 
Beyond these basic failures, capital defense specialists maintain that 
the complex and unique procedures of capital trials demand particular ex-
pertise.82 Death penalty trials are bifurcated into separate guilt and penalty 
phases. If the defendant is found guilty in the first phase, the jury will, in 
the second phase, determine whether the particular defendant deserves to 
be executed. To do so, the jury will consider aggravating and mitigating 
factors enumerated in statutory guidelines.83 The defense attorney must 
possess familiarity with the statutory schemes and experience explaining 
them to juries. Zealous representation of a capital defendant might require 
the capacity for appellate work or filing post-conviction petitions in federal 
court.84 Even more than other criminal trials, capital defense demands spe-
cialized knowledge and highly polished litigation skills. 
The other argument for outside intervention stems from a concern 
about local community outrage.85 The horrendous nature of capital crimes 
makes the hunger to punish almost predictable.86 Donald Beschle has sug-
gested that the need to identify an enemy as the source of any community’s 
discord is instinctive,87 and executions function primarily to provide a 
primitive ritual that unites the community based on hatred for a scape-
 81.  Howard, supra note 9, at 894-95. See also Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916-18 (2012) 
(criticizing Alabama’s inadequate standards and funding). In the past two decades, states that previously 
maintained no minimum qualifications, namely Texas, Mississippi, and Florida, have since adopted 
them, while others have made improvements. For a current summary of state standards, see the National 
Center for State Courts website. Capital Case Representation, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.ncsc.org/topics/access-and-fairness/indigent-defense/state-links.aspx?cat=Capital%20Ca
se%20Representation (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). The downside of increased credentials, however, is 
that many local attorneys cannot meet them; the requirement of minimum numbers of years of capital 
defense work necessarily excludes anyone new to the practice. Conversation with Robert J. Smith (Jan. 
23, 2014). 
 82.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 55, at 259-60. 
 83.  In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court ruled that a statute’s provision for 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors ensured that the administration of the death penalty 
would not be arbitrary or discriminatory. The statute at issue required the sentencing authority to find at 
least one aggravating factor listed in the statute in order to impose the death penalty, and it required that 
this same authority consider the defendant’s background as well as circumstances of the crime in miti-
gation of the implementation of capital punishment. Typical statutory aggravating factors include the 
identity of the victim as a law enforcement official or that the murder was committed by torture. Typi-
cal mitigating factors include the age of the defendant or that the defendant was under extreme emo-
tional disturbance. Statutes generally also include a “catch-all” factor that allows in any evidence 
pertaining to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the offense. 
 84.  Howard, supra note 9, at 877-88. 
 85.  See Baldus et al., supra note 47, at 1723. 
 86.  Howard, supra note 9, at 880. 
 87.  Donald L. Beschle, Why Do People Support Capital Punishment? The Death Penalty as 
Community Ritual, 33 CONN. L. REV. 765, 775 (2001). 
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goat.88 An outsider lawyer may be the only lawyer with the emotional and 
intellectual distance to feel comfortable representing the defendant. 
Beyond any internal conflict, local lawyers must also contend with ex-
ternal, political influences. Community outrage pressures prosecutors, 
judges, and juries to find and punish perpetrators of highly visible crimes.89
This has been true particularly in white-victim cases with black defendants, 
which attract disproportionate amounts of media attention. Prosecutors 
allocate disproportionate resources to pursuing such cases and may be more 
accommodating of victims’ families’ requests to seek the death penalty.90
Local communities may be too insular for a lawyer from within to separate 
from the pack. 
A local attorney might also encounter economic disincentives. Aside 
from personal ties or prejudices, private attorneys may feel beholden to 
current or potential paying clients who view the capital crime as indefensi-
ble. Similarly, the attorneys may depend for their appointments on local 
judges who are anxious to resolve capital cases without delay. Such judges 
may pressure appointed capital defense counsel not to file motions that 
would slow the process or not to request fees for experts who would com-
plicate it. Therefore, even when lawyers do accept capital appointments, 
their zeal might be hampered by fear of alienating not only neighbors and 
friends, but also future sources of business. 
In contrast, outsider lawyers may be free from the restrictions imposed 
by these influences. 
B. Colonial Baggage of Outsider Intervention 
Outsider lawyers, however, risk replicating and reinforcing another set 
of problematic circumstances. Insights of postcolonial theorists can help to 
shed light on these dynamics. Critics have challenged international human 
rights organizations as replicating colonial relationships when they justify 
intervention measures by essentializing “Other” cultures as particularly 
oppressive of women or particularly homophobic. A number of feminist 
organizations use the status of women in a society as a marker of moderni-
ty, mimicking the rhetoric of imperialism.91 They treat women in various 
Asian, African, and Latin American countries as victims of their cultures, 
 88.  Id. at 774-75.  
 89.  Howard, supra note 9, at 880. 
 90.  Id.
 91.  See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” 
Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 12 (2002); 
Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1196 (2001). 
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denying such women’s agency within patriarchy and flattening the cultures 
of which they are a part.92 Highlighting violence against women in the 
global South while neglecting its prevalence in the global North contributes 
to the construction of a dichotomy between liberated women of the global 
North and oppressed women of the global South.93 This reconstructs the 
image of Northern behavior as a neutral norm, and reveals the desire to rely 
on imagined conceptions of the Other for definition of oneself.94
The analogy to North and South relations within the United States is 
not difficult to see.95 Academic and popular literature that describes the 
South as a unique region of the country allows the North to occupy the 
position of the neutral norm, interchangeable with the nation as a whole. At 
the same time, the North has been defined largely in opposition to the 
South.96 Admittedly, the implications of postcolonial theory must be inter-
preted differently within one nation dominated by whites,97 where many of 
the interventions seek to protect African-American minorities whose ances-
tors were colonized by the ancestors of those whose practices the interven-
ers now challenge.98 Yet the phenomenon of outsider intervention, armed 
with the rationale of improving the locals’ “backward” and “uncivilized” 
society, shares important similarities with international lawyering for social 
change.99
1. Colonial Relationship of North and South 
The economic, military, and legal relationships between the North and 
the South suggest a pattern of colonialism.  The North and the federal gov-
ernment, while distinct, have been collapsed in descriptions of their inter-
ventions in the South, as well as in narratives that depict the South as a 
 92.  Volpp, supra note 91, at 1211. 
 93.  Id. at 1211-12. 
 94.  Id. at 1204. 
 95.  See Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 72. 
 96.  See Griffin, supra note 6, at 17 (“The South became defined . . . by southerners and non-
southerners alike ‘in opposition to’ America and . . . ‘opposite to’ the broader culture.”). See also R. 
Bruce Brasell, The Degeneration of Nationalism: Colonialism, Perversion, and the American South, 56 
MISS. Q. 33 (2003). 
 97.  Id.
 98.  See Griffin, supra note 6, at 20, 22 (arguing that “the relationship between America and the 
South was substantially more complex than that of opposition only” and the two were deeply intercon-
nected, but that does not contradict the observation that the identity of the South was constructed in 
opposition to that of the nation as a whole).  
 99.  See id. at 10 (citing references to South as “alien member of national family” and as “different 
from Massachusetts” as “the Congo”), 20 (describing myths of Southern culture), 25-26 (same). See 
also id. at 10-11 (highlighting “North’s ‘gullibility: a volitionless, almost helpless capacity and eager-
ness to believe anything about the South not even provided it be derogatory but merely bizarre enough 
and strange enough’”) (quoting WILLIAM FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST 152 (1946)). 
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unique region of the country with unique problems.100 If the moral impera-
tive of Northern lawyers’ intervention into Southern legal systems rests on 
a belief that Southerners are educationally deficient or uniquely racist, that 
premise requires deeper analysis.101
Economic dynamics between the North and the South in the United 
States have inspired scholars to describe the relationship between the re-
gions as colonial. Economist Joseph Persky has argued that the urban North 
has exploited the South’s agrarian economy.102 Like any dependent colony, 
the South functioned as the supplier of raw materials and the consumer of 
Northern factories’ finished products.103 When the North developed a di-
verse industrial system of divided labor, the South continued to maintain a 
specialized economy reliant on slavery.104 Until the growth of the New 
South in recent years,105 the North may have shouldered responsibility for 
the South’s underdevelopment as an “artificially underurbanized” land-
scape.106
The pattern of Northern and federal intervention in the South—from 
the Civil War, to military occupation during Reconstruction, and again 
during the Civil Rights Movement—further supports the interpretation of 
the South as a colony. The Civil Rights Movement was marked by outsider 
lawyers from the North physically inserting themselves into the Southern 
landscape.107 These interventions constituted part of a larger critique of 
Southern culture.108 Jack Greenberg, former director and counsel of LDF 
viewed himself and his colleagues as “crusaders.”109 Federal intervention 
 100.  See NATALIE J. RING, THE PROBLEM SOUTH: REGION, EMPIRE, AND THE NEW LIBERAL 
STATE, 1880-1930 (2012); Griffin supra note 6, at 13-14 (describing social construction of problems as 
uniquely associated with Southern region). 
 101.  See GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 15 (suggesting that, in the context of civil rights work, 
lawsuits simply provided a more effective attack on the South’s overt racism than on the North’s more 
hidden version). 
 102.  See, e.g., JOSEPH J. PERSKY, THE BURDEN OF DEPENDENCY 3 (1992).  
 103.  Id. at 9. 
 104.  Id. at 4.  
 105.  TRACY THOMPSON, THE NEW MIND OF THE SOUTH 196-204 (2013) (describing “impressions 
of a returning native” in the City of Atlanta, a center of the New South). 
 106.  Id.
 107.  See BELKNAP, supra note 17, at 128-58 (describing Freedom Summer of 1964, in which more 
than 150 Northern law students and attorneys accompanied hundreds of Northern college students to 
Mississippi to register black voters and teach in freedom schools); GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 13, 
14, 17 (Both the NAACP and LDF were headquartered in New York City,  but “th[e] fact [that most 
NAACP members and most African-Americans lived in the South,] along with the reality that lawsuits 
were more effective against virulent Southern racism and state-sanctioned segregation laws than against 
the often covert Northern variety of each, led  lawyers to focus the legal attack in the South.”)).  
 108. Gary Peller, White Anxiety, Cultural Imperialism, and the Ideological Realignment of Brown,
in RACE, LAW AND CULTURE 199 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997).  
 109.  See GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 133. 
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promoted a Northern approach to education as enlightened and legitimate, 
in contrast to the racism and religiosity of Southern traditions.110 Gary 
Peller argues that the North forced the South to adopt a rationalist, techno-
cratic, and standardized mode of education.111 When the National Guard 
entered the South to enforce federal statutes and court decisions and to 
protect black and white activists, Southerners understood that force was 
being justified on the grounds that theirs was not a civilized society.112
Many local whites resisted these invasions. Aside from violent and ex-
tralegal activities, they also launched more “civilized” responses. Southern 
judges selectively enforced bar membership requirements to exclude, as 
one Mississippi judge described the outsider lawyers, “Jews and niggers 
from New York.”113 Another form of white resistance included depicting 
the outsider intervenors as carpetbaggers, intruding for their own selfish 
purposes.114
The historical dynamic of military, legal, and cultural intervention, 
and local resistance to such intervention, forms the backdrop for capital 
defense in the South. Outsider lawyers engaged in this work must be mind-
ful of utilizing colonial rhetoric, recreating colonial dynamics, or simply 
exposing the legitimacy of their work to that critique. 
2. Colonial Rhetoric in Rationales for Intervention 
The rationales for outsider intervention—expertise and will—carry in-
herent weaknesses due to the potential for charges of cultural imperialism. 
Capital defense experts argue that Northern or federal intervention in capi-
tal defense in the South is justified on the basis that Southern states have 
failed to provide the highly professionalized assistance that capital defense 
requires.115 While capital procedures are indeed complex, the concept of 
Northern lawyers’ intervention as a needed professionalizing influence 
sounds remarkably similar to the portrait of an imperialist empire as a civi-
lizing force bringing progress to undeveloped cultures.116
 110.  See Peller, supra note 108, at 199. 
 111.  Id.
 112.  Id.
 113.  Interview with Jack Greenberg, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and former direc-
tor-counselor of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in New York City, New York (Jan. 
16, 2002); GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 348. 
 114.  GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 99. 
 115.  See supra Part II.A. 
 116.  See EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 3-4, 206-07 (1978). See also Uma Narayan, Essence of 
a Culture and a Sense of History: A Feminist Critique of Cultural Essentialism, 13:2 HAPATIA 86, 89-
90 (1998). 
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Practitioners and policy makers should examine the practical implica-
tions of this rhetoric, as it can translate into resource allocation decisions 
with important consequences. Expertise and financial resources are difficult 
to reject, but their delivery may not be wholly satisfactory as a long-range 
strategy for social change. Intervention by outsiders can stymie grassroots 
growth, and to the extent that intervention involves an influx of resources, 
one might reasonably ask whether some of those resources could be redi-
rected to develop and learn from local expertise.117
As for the argument that outsiders are uniquely positioned to provide 
assistance because of their distance from local pressures, this, too, can 
gloss over the complexity of local concerns and overlook the potential for 
strong internal dissent. Although racialized community outrage does put 
pressure on law enforcement and the judiciary, the depiction of Southern 
communities as “instinctive” simplifies individual and collective views and 
dismisses any pro-capital punishment position as pure irrationality.118
While that depiction may resonate for attorneys and scholars who view the 
death penalty as a gruesome form of modern-day lynching, it does not 
grapple with the substance of the community’s discord. It implies that those 
of us against the death penalty have harnessed our baser instincts, or devel-
oped from a primitive state, in ways other communities have not. It relies 
on the same language used to justify imperialism: certain communities are 
not civilized enough to govern themselves. 
This approach blinds outsider lawyers to the variety of interactions 
that occur in such communities, and in their own.119 It does not account for 
the Southern activists who have participated in anti-death penalty efforts or 
the local jurors who have convicted white supremacists for violence.120 It 
 117.  Some of the most successful capital defender projects today provide training and support for 
local lawyers. See Smith, supra note 55, at 268-72 (describing trial consulting projects). This is a step in 
the right direction, though it still replicates the dynamic of the locals in the position of uneducated and 
in need of assistance. Another option would be to partner local and non-local lawyers on individual 
cases, so each could contribute his or her assets and learn from the other.  
 118.  See Beschle, supra note 87, at 775. 
 119.  See FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-
1930, at 3-4 (1992) (arguing that social scientists who seek to explain lynching by region-wide phe-
nomena neglect significant differences in numbers between various Southern states). See also Christian 
Boulanger & Austin Sarat, Putting Culture into the Picture: Toward a Comparative Analysis of State 
Killings, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1, 3-4 (Austin Sarat & Christian Boulan-
ger, eds., 2005) (“Some believe that a ‘civilizing process’ leads inexorably to rejection of legalized state 
killing. . . . [T]his idea is inadequate to explain what has happened in abolitionist countries and might be 
misleading when thinking about the global process of abolition.”). 
 120.  See David McCord, Imagining A Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment, 50 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 38-39 (1998) (describing street protests organized by the Southern Coalition on Jails and Pris-
ons); PHILIP ENGLISH MACKEY, VOICES AGAINST DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 1787-1975, xlv-xlvi (1976) (describing local Southern officials’ opposition to capital 
punishment); id. at xxxii (describing “hundreds of small campaigns and modest successes”).
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omits the powerful role of communities of color in the South.121 It fails to 
explain why Northern states have done a poor job of providing adequate 
capital defense. The contrast between rural and urban capital punishment 
rates has in fact become more visible than that between North and South.122
In formulating arguments for federal funding of intervention in Southern 
courts, it has been helpful to paint a picture of Southern communities as 
uniquely troubled, but oversimplifying cultural and legal dynamics may 
ultimately make it more difficult for outsiders to locate a space to inter-
vene.
III. CHALLENGES FOR OUTSIDER LAWYERS
If lawyers abandoned all interventionist projects, important work 
might be neglected. To suggest that lawyers should serve only clients in 
their own communities would be to limit a significant source of power for 
social change. The question is how, as a community outsider, to intervene. 
The project of developing a legitimate and effective approach to interven-
tion requires “negotiating [the] hazardous terrain somewhere between un-
self critical ethnocentrism and hyper-self critical cultural relativism.”123
This part addresses some of the possibilities for and challenges of that 
negotiation. First, it highlights the challenges for outsider lawyers launch-
ing direct critiques of local culture. Second, it turns to the possibility of 
indirect attacks through the use of lawyers’ professional tools, but 
acknowledges the challenges of this approach as well. Finally, it suggests 
that for outsider lawyers to intervene effectively, they must forgo some of 
the privilege of their outsider status, and rely on the language and strategy 
of local actors.
A. Vulnerability of Cause Lawyers’ Cultural Critiques 
Outsider lawyers may be well positioned to identify systemic injustic-
es deserving of fundamental critiques. Yet, in the case of capital defense, 
 121.  See HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-1994, 111-16 (1996) (describing African-American activism); Charles 
H. Martin, The Civil Rights Congress and Southern Black Defendants, 71 GEO. HISTORICAL Q. 25, 34-
50 (1987) (describing death penalty work of the Civil Rights Congress); Eric L. Muller, The Legal 
Defense Fund’s Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 Y. L. & POL’Y
REV. 158 (1985) (describing the capital defense work of the NAACP LDF).
 122.  For a discussion of the importance of focusing on counties, rather than states, as the geo-
graphic unit, see Smith, supra note 55, at 232-35.
 123.  Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, 
and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 525, 527.  
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direct challenges to the racism of local systems have fared poorly.124 Local 
actors resent the critiques of their communities. 
Judges and juries perceive race-related critiques of the death penalty 
as condemnations of their courtrooms and communities. Refusal to recog-
nize race discrimination claims reflects discomfort with labeling state offi-
cials and institutions as racist. The judiciary is reluctant to criticize 
prosecutors, whose discretion provides a key element of a functioning 
criminal justice system.125 Prosecutors understand the judges’ attachment 
to the existing system, and where defense attorneys produce discrimination 
statistics, prosecutors can directly counter-attack: “He is a racist. . . if he 
seeks the death penalty? So we’re all racists.”126 This tactic may resonate 
strongly for judges who resent the implied condemnation of their own par-
ticipation in capital adjudication.127
Arguments that have highlighted the local history of racism have 
faced stiff resistance. In one pre-trial hearing, an attorney argued that his 
African-American client’s equal protection rights could not be upheld in a 
courtroom displaying the Georgia flag.128 The attorney called expert wit-
nesses to explain the history of the flag as an emblem of pride in slavery.129
He called William S. McFeely, a professor at the University of Georgia and 
native of New York, to describe how the General Assembly of Georgia 
integrated the confederate battle flag into the Georgia flag to express re-
sistance to desegregation.130 In essence, the defense counsel’s strategy 
asked the judge to recognize the Georgia flag as a symbol of oppression, 
with no place in civilized society.131 As McFeely later explained, “[T]o no 
one’s surprise, [the judge] was not impressed.”132
It is difficult to imagine that a native Georgian would have made such 
an argument about the State flag. An outsider lawyer’s perspective can be 
 124.  The recent passage and repeal of the Racial Justice Act in North Carolina offers one illustra-
tion of the mixed reception from legislatures. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2012 (repealed June 19, 2013). 
See Lynn Bonner, Legislators Close in on Racial Justice Act Repeal, CHARLOTTE OBS. (Jun. 4, 2013), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/06/04/4085682/legislators-close-in-on-
racial.html#.UktZtWR4a4c; Seth Kotch & Robert Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long 
Struggle With Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2035 (2010) 
(“North Carolina has chosen for the first time to look squarely at the connection between race and the 
death penalty.”). 
 125.  See Blume, supra note 19, at 1808-09. 
 126.  MCFEELY, supra note 36, at 35. 
 127.  Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We Are Moving Towards Moratoria on 
Executions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733, 745-46 (2001). 
 128.  MCFEELY, supra note 36, at 25. 
 129.  Id. at 30-32. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id.
 132.  Id. at 184. 
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positive in its lack of attachment to the past and the high expectations it 
sets for social justice goals, but the flip side of this approach can be arro-
gance and carelessness. The outsider lawyer can lack an understanding of 
social meanings and can convey hostility to tradition. Too broad a critique 
of culture requires community members to reject their identities, in this 
case as Southerners or Georgians, as a prerequisite to embracing a norm of 
equality. Such a choice imposes a loss that the outsider lawyer may fail to 
recognize. Moreover, it prioritizes the dominant definition of culture and 
demands a choice that should not be necessary.133
At the other end of the spectrum from such insensitivity lies the paral-
ysis of cultural relativism. In the infamous case of McCleskey v. Kemp,
where the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court abdicated its responsibility 
for protecting African-American capital defendants from local race dis-
crimination, the majority claimed an obligation to avoid undermining the 
“moral values of the people.”134 Faced with a direct challenge to the racist 
administration of capital punishment in the State of Georgia, the majority 
looked the other way.135 Warren McCleskey was an African-American man 
convicted of robbery and murder of a white police officer.136 In support of 
a post-conviction petition for habeas corpus relief, NAACP LDF attorneys 
submitted an empirical study that demonstrated systemic race discrimina-
tion in Georgia’s application of the death penalty.137 The study documented 
that black defendants who killed white victims were more likely than any 
other defendants to be sentenced to death.138 The majority of the Court, 
however, held that the study was insufficient to show that any of the local 
actors in the particular case acted with discriminatory intent, and left the 
state’s judgment undisturbed.139 The majority refused to issue a decision 
 133.  See THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 3 (2013) (critiquing view of “black people whose families 
had roots in the South . . . as just ‘black,’ not ‘Southern’—as if skin color made them magically immune 
to feeling affection for the place they called home”); Sunder, supra note 5, at, 560-61, 566 (arguing 
against creation of a choice between culture and equality, and against forcing community members to 
exit culture to claim equality). 
 134.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
383 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting)). 
 135.  McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308. 
 136.  Id. at 283.  
 137.  Id. at 286-87. 
 138.  Statistics showed that defendants in Georgia charged with killing white victims received the 
death penalty more than those charged with killing black victims, and that blacks convicted of killing 
whites were far more likely to receive the death penalty than any other black-white combination of 
defendants and victims. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. The study further illustrated that Georgia prosecu-
tors had sought the death penalty in 70 percent of the cases involving black defendants and white 
victims, compared to 32 percent of the cases involving white defendants and white victims, 19 percent 
of the cases involving white defendants and black victims, and 15 percent of the cases involving black 
defendants and black victims. Id. at 287. 
 139.  Id. at 297, 319. 
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that turned on the finding that Georgia’s administration of capital punish-
ment was a system of race discrimination.140
The choice in McCleskey to leave assessment of capital punishment to 
local legislatures neglected the presence and authenticity of local expres-
sions of opposition to capital punishment.141 This choice seems particularly 
disingenuous in a decision regarding the scope of the Court’s obligation to 
protect minorities, whose influence on local political processes may be 
limited.142 The decision is one example of how sensitivity to local culture 
may be used as an excuse for inaction even when members of the local 
community advocate change. 
B. Vulnerability of Conventional Lawyers’ Procedural Tools143
Mindful of setting off culture clashes, most capital defense attorneys 
steer away from grand critiques of the death penalty and instead focus on 
zealous use of conventional lawyering tools.144 Rather than present them-
selves explicitly as cause lawyers, these attorneys draw instead on profes-
 140.  Id. at 291-92. As the majority opinion infamously admitted, “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its 
logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice 
system.” Id. at 314-15. This language suggests that, while the majority might have felt restricted by 
principles of federalism, the role of the judiciary, or the political influence of Southern neighbors, even 
more, it may have feared shaking the foundations of its own authority. 
 141.  Id. at 319 (leaving assessment of capital punishment to local legislatures).  
 142.  On the neglect of minority views by parties claiming to respect tradition, see Nussbaum, 
supra note 3, at 386 (“[T]he objector . . . oversimplifies tradition, ignoring countertraditions of female 
defiance and strength, ignoring women’s protests against harmful traditions, and in general forgetting to 
ask women themselves what they think of these norms . . . .”). See also Blume, supra note 19, at 1807-
08 (noting that lower court judges have gladly used McCleskey to reject claims of countywide discrimi-
nation).
 143. This Essay uses Sarat and Scheingold’s definitions of “cause lawyering” and “conventional 
lawyering.” See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 1-22 (2004). Conventional lawyering “involves the de-
ployment of a set of technical skills on behalf of ends determined by the client, not the lawyer.” Id. at 2. 
In contrast to cause lawyering, conventional lawyering “is neither a domain for moral or political 
advocacy nor a place to express the lawyer’s beliefs about the way society should be organized, dis-
putes resolved, and values expressed.” Id.
Capital defense may be interpreted as a hybrid. Capital defense lawyers represent individual cli-
ents, and the form of their work resembles that of conventional lawyers, yet many of the lawyers be-
lieve in an abolitionist cause and see the aim their work as saving lives. See Thomas M. Hilbink, You 
Know the Type . . .: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 657, 665, 673, 681 (2004) 
(defining and comparing three types of cause lawyering: “proceduralist,” “elite/vanguard” and “grass-
roots”). For arguments that all criminal defense is cause lawyering, see Abbe Smith, Defending Defend-
ing: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
925, 934-36, 943, 957 n.158 (2000), and Monroe H. Freedman, Why It’s Essential to Represent “Those 
People”, in HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE? 73, 78 (Abbe Smith & Monroe Freedman eds., 
2013). 
 144.  Interview with Bryan Stevenson, supra note 51. 
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sional expertise.145 As Anthony Alfieri has highlighted, many capital de-
fenders use “procedural devices” to serve individual clients, engaging in 
motion practice and filing petitions for additional levels of judicial re-
view.146 When they raise constitutional claims, they focus primarily on 
other lawyers’ failures to observe the standards of the profession.147
This approach has met significant success. Challenges on direct ap-
peal, habeas corpus petitions, and motions for stays of executions have 
together prevented hundreds of potential executions.148 Even reluctant state 
courts have recognized particularly egregious examples of substandard 
behavior by local counsel.149 Successive habeas petitions, combined with 
motions for stays, have also created lengthy delays, during which time 
defense teams have uncovered evidence that justified retrials or lesser sen-
tences.150
Procedural tactics, however, may have provided fodder for opponents 
to attack capital defenders’ legitimacy and support.151 Opponents argued 
that the use of procedures resulting in delays was inherently manipulative: 
the lawyers knew the underlying substance of petitions was frivolous, and 
the filings suggested the absence of ethical scruples.152 Legislators com-
plained that, rather than promoting fair and balanced trials, the lawyers 
were attempting to outsmart the system and distorting the criminal process. 
In 1996, under mounting pressure, Congress ended federal funding for Post 
Conviction Defender Organizations and sharply restricted the power of 
federal courts to hear habeas petitions.153
Opponents portrayed the expertise of counsel as fundamentally devoid 
of moral content. While the attack sang an old song about lawyers as hired 
 145.  See Hilbink, supra note 143, at 672 (“In describing its early involvement in the civil rights-era 
South, the [Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law] made clear that its representatives went 
to Mississippi not as ‘activists’ or ‘civil rights lawyers.’ Their goal was not to ‘target’ Southern white 
racism, but rather to simply serve as lawyers for a client . . . who approached them and requested assis-
tance.”). 
 146.  Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Penalty 
Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 334 (1996). 
 147.  See Hilbink, supra note 143, at 668 (describing the work of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law as “proceduralist” because the organization “described its mission as getting the 
American legal profession to live up to its responsibilities”). 
 148.  See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR 
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 pp. 30-32 (June 12, 2000), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/liebman final.pdf (4500 death sentences 
were reversed from 1973 to 1995); Alfieri, supra note 146, at 340-42. 
 149.  Howard, supra note 9, at 921 n.197.
 150.  Alfieri, supra note 146, at 334. 
 151.  Id. at 335-36. 
 152.  See Margaret Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and 
Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1709 n.223 (1997). 
 153.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2014); Howard, supra note 9, at 865. 
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guns, it drew strength from the carpetbagger myth and a stylized image of 
meddlesome Northern attorneys. One editorial in a local Southern paper 
complained, “A few smart lawyers who are agents of different organiza-
tions, seek to hamper justice though the employment of legal technicalities. 
They may bring suffering to many innocent Negroes.”154 The message is 
that these overeducated individuals bring their bag of tricks from their 
schools in the North, interfere with the honest Southern system in place, 
and harm, rather than help, the locals that they claim to support. Prosecu-
tors have drawn on this image to disparage expert witnesses offered by 
defense counsel.155 The very domain of expertise has been tainted by 
Northerners’ historical use of it as a rationale for intervention. 
Technical, expertise-based arguments not only trigger ugly portraits 
highlighting the lawyers’ outsider status, but also they can erase a client’s 
voice.156 Take the situation where a post-conviction attorney argues that a 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because of a trial at-
torney’s failure to present mitigation evidence at sentencing or failure to 
file a motion for appointment of an expert witness. This approach places 
fundamental choices within the trial lawyer’s discretion and deemphasizes 
the client’s participation in the case.157 While strategic decisions generally 
fall to the lawyer under governing professional rules, the lawyer must con-
sult with the client,158 and a client might wish to override the lawyer’s de-
cision about, for example, the presentation of mitigation evidence concern-
concerning the client’s difficult childhood.159 Arguing in a post-conviction 
petition that presentation of such evidence is an ethical obligation, whose 
omission constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation, leaves little space for 
the client to raise preferences related to strategy or dignity.160 One might 
make a similar argument with respect to attempts to negotiate a plea. In 
2003, the American Bar Association revised its guidelines for the perfor-
mance of capital defense counsel to emphasize the importance of pursuing 
pleas, and advocates have interpreted these guidelines to mean that encour-
aging a defendant to accept a life sentence is fundamental to competent 
representation.161 While this view might be correct, it does squeeze the 
 154.  GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 99 (quoting unidentified editorial in local Orlando newspaper). 
 155.  Id. at 148. 
 156.  Alfieri, supra note 146, at 344. 
 157.  Id.
 158.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.2, R. 1.4 (2013). 
 159.  Alfieri, supra note 146, at 342. 
 160.  Id.
 161.  See AM. BAR. ASS’N, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 10.9.1 (rev. ed. 2003); Russell Stetler, Com-
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space for deference to clients’ stated wishes. Particularly where the lawyer 
is an outsider, she must be careful to listen for the client’s expressed 
knowledge of social context and values.162
C. Discourse of Morality Grounded in Local Community 
Recognizing the limits of post-conviction appeals, and the potential 
for successful representation in initial proceedings, commentators have 
encouraged capital defense projects to front-load their resources, shifting 
attention from post-conviction to trial.163 New trial projects offer training 
to meet the goal of improved trial representation.164 To the extent that out-
sider lawyers defend clients at trial, however, they must give special con-
sideration to overcoming barriers between themselves and local juries. As 
this subpart will discuss, successful trial strategies must be mindful to draw 
on, rather than reject, Southern culture. 
The very fact that an attorney is comfortable representing a capital de-
fendant may be the biggest barrier between her and any death-qualified 
jury.165 Any additional factors that make the attorney unfamiliar only make 
her less trustworthy.166 Convincing the jurors of one’s own credibility and 
morality is almost as difficult an endeavor as convincing them of the de-
fendant’s. The image of Northern lawyers who manipulate the law for their 
own political ends only magnifies this task. 
A potential pitfall of attorneys who view themselves as saving their 
clients is to slip into portraying the client as a victim of societal forces.167
Victimization rhetoric in the presentation of mitigation factors can imply 
that the crime was outside the defendant’s control. The attempt to shift 
blame away from the defendant may be met with cynicism.168 “Dwelling” 
on a childhood of abuse or a life of structural oppression can appear to be 
an excuse for the defendant’s behavior.169 Worse still, it may convey that 
mentary on Counsel’s Duty to Seek and Negotiate a Disposition in Capital Cases (ABA Guideline 
10.9.1), 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2003). 
 162.  Anthony Alfieri has argued that wresting control away from the client can erase the client’s 
perspective from the defense presented. One result is that the jury then cannot hear him accepting 
responsibility. This may create a narrative lacking moral accountability. Alfieri, supra note 146, at 342-
43. 
 163.  See, e.g., Smith supra note 55, at 267. 
 164.  Id. at 268-72 (describing trial consulting projects). 
 165.  Interview with Bryan Stevenson, supra note 51. 
 166.  Id.
 167.  Alfieri, supra note 146, at 342-43. 
 168.  Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Re-
morse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1590-91 (1998). 
 169.  MCFEELY, supra note 36, at 174. 
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the attorney is blaming the local community for abuse or neglect experi-
enced by the defendant. If the attorney is an outsider, mitigation arguments 
describing oppression may come across as pedantic. The outsider attor-
ney’s presence, in combination with the suggestion that the defendant suf-
fered at the hands of society, may convey that the defendant needed an 
outsider to save him from the community. 
Defense counsel’s compromising position in the sentencing phase 
makes potent the image of the unscrupulous carpetbagger. If the penalty 
phase occurs, that means the jury did not trust defense counsel enough to 
honor her request at the conclusion of the trial’s guilt phase. At sentencing, 
the jury’s guilty verdict cannot be contradicted without inspiring resent-
ment,170 and yet the lawyer must appear consistent after arguing for a dif-
ferent result. Turning her back on the position she took in the guilt phase 
would implicate herself as previously trying to free a murderer.171 Failing 
to acknowledge her awkward position or attempting to portray it as the 
mandate of the lawyer’s job threatens the attorney’s credibility and moral 
authority.172 The defense attorney must therefore begin the penalty phase 
by verbally recognizing the legitimacy of the verdict without agreeing with 
it.
Once a juror has found a defendant guilty of murder, she will likely 
want to punish him, and scolding her for this retributive instinct can back-
fire and cause resentment. The problem can be exacerbated by Northern 
depictions of Southerners as primitive and instinct-driven, which can mate-
rialize in the description of the client and in any rebuke of the jury. Deny-
ing the defendant’s responsibility can appear to challenge the jury’s 
decision. A better approach to avoid a capital sentence is to convince the 
jury that life in prison is itself a severe punishment.173 In this way, the at-
torney respects the jury’s authority but requests that it consider alternative 
resolutions. Note that attorneys can also use the jury selection process to 
seek out jurors open to mercy as an alternative to the ultimate punish-
ment.174
Successful capital defense attorneys have learned to adopt a moral 
discourse of “redemptive community.”175 Unlike some of their predeces-
 170.  Sundby, supra note 168, at 1578. 
 171.  Mark Costanzo & Julie Peterson, Attorney Persuasion in the Capital Penalty Phase: A Con-
tent Analysis of Closing Arguments, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 125, 131-32 (1994). 
 172.  Id.
 173.  Id. at 140.  
 174.  See McCord, supra note 120 (highlighting religious “themes . . . [of] rejection of retribution 
as a legitimate goal of punishment, and adherence to the principles of mercy, forgiveness, and reconcil-
iation”). 
 175.  Alfieri, supra note 146, at 352. 
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sors, these attorneys adopt a tone of morality based in community.176 In-
stead of treating either the client or the local community as ignorant, attor-
neys turn to those members of the community in the jury, and urge them to 
use their power to define the community as they see fit.177
Without flattening it into one oversimplified set of beliefs, attorneys 
must face the role of religion as a force shaping community views.178 In-
stead of ceding the force of religious rhetoric to those who might use it to 
bolster claims for revenge,179 successful defense attorneys draw from 
Judeo-Christian language about redemption.180 Rather than reject it, the 
lawyers draw on and reinvent the language of the community. Where a 
prosecutor dismissed mitigating evidence by arguing that the defendant was 
“just plain mean” even as a child, Stephen Bright of the Southern Center 
for Human Rights, originally from Tennessee, responded by showing how 
this view denied “the redemptive power of God Almighty.”181 While the 
narrative constructed by capital defense attorneys need not be explicitly 
religious, it cannot be hostile to religion. The most successful penalty phase 
summations emphasize “morality, justice, and human motivation.”182
CONCLUSION
Scholars and activists have long debated the legitimacy of outsider in-
tervention in community disputes. When, if ever, is it appropriate to take 
sides in, or participate in the resolution of, conflicts within a community of 
which one is not a member? What is the role of outsider lawyers? 
Lawyers could have a special role to play as professional interlopers. 
As crafters of laws or private agreements, they can work towards the pre-
vention of strife, or, as mediators or judges, they can aid in its resolution. 
 176.  Id. at 350. 
 177. See MCFEELY, supra note 36, at 166 (describing Stephen Bright’s use of the words “we” and 
“kill” to convey the jurors’ responsibility and choice in the matter of putting the defendant to death). 
See also Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases 
from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 162 (1990) (“When lawyers resolve con-
flicts by arguing about rights, they contribute to the creation of a community organized in one particular 
way. When lawyers respond to conflicts and resolve conflicts by telling stories, they contribute to the 
creation of a community organized in [a] very different fashion.”). 
 178. Boulanger & Sarat, supra note 119, at 5-6 (describing need for research on “how religious 
beliefs translate” into views on death penalty).
 179.  MCFEELY, supra note 36, at 53 (noting “concept of a wrathful God and death as a means of 
atonement”). 
 180.  See GARDNER C. HANKS, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 25-51 (1997) (describing arguments from New and Old 
Testaments). 
 181.  MCFEELY, supra note 36, at 168. 
 182.  Costanzo & Peterson, supra note 171, at 126. 
596 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:2 
Attorneys also serve as professional partisans, supporting rather than quiet-
ing dissent. As lobbyists or litigators, they bring professional tools that 
generate power for particular parties. Often just their presence weighs in 
favor of their clients because of the lawyers’ status as elites. 
Cause lawyer outsiders can use their privileged outsider position for 
social good. As outsiders, they bring the advantage of perspective that al-
lows them to see the injustice in the status quo and to challenge it head-on 
without fear of personal cost. As outsider lawyers, they legitimate the inter-
ests of those whose cause they advance, presenting their clients’ demands 
as legal claims swathed in the legitimacy of the rule of law. 
Yet the case of capital defense in the U.S. South shows the flip side of 
this: head-on challenges from outsider lawyers will be met with resistance 
and possibly special resentment because of the status of these challengers. 
Direct critiques of the racism in the administration of capital trials can be 
painted as attacks on the entire community. Even drawing on the rule of 
law may be fraught, given a history of federal military and Northern activ-
ist interventions in the name of law enforcement. Even to suggest that the 
law restricts the community’s resolution methods may be viewed as pro-
vocative. The presence of the outsider lawyers in Southern courts may it-
self be portrayed as hostile and undemocratic. 
To avoid challenging culture, many capital defense attorneys have 
drawn less on their perspective as outsiders and more on their position as 
lawyers. These attorneys have turned away from explicit narratives of ra-
cial discrimination and instead sought to utilize tools of conventional law-
yers. These include appeals and post-conviction petitions that find flaws in 
the quality of the lawyering services provided at trial. This approach has 
proven more successful than the broader critiques of culture, but the use of 
these devices generates its own challenges. Particularly for outsider law-
yers, reliance on their professional position can feed the construction of the 
lawyers as—even worse than pedantic missionaries—amoral tricksters. 
Emphasis on the special expertise of outsider lawyers can also highlight 
their outsider status and thereby undercut the legitimacy of their work. 
Professional tools offer significant value, and outsider lawyers may be 
especially well equipped to utilize them. Yet direct attacks on systemic 
injustice may require internal expression to be perceived and sustained as 
legitimate. For outsider lawyers to intervene effectively, they may need to 
abandon to some degree their privileged position as outsider lawyers and to 
focus on learning from the communities in which they seek to work. This 
will require not shying away from moral discourse but embracing it, and 
doing so alongside local dissenters. 
